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ABSTRACT FOR
THE FUTILE DEBATE OVER THE 
MORALITY OF THE DEATH PENALTY
The current  issue of the Stanford Law Review reveals (or at least may spark) a surprising resurgence 
of interest in the morality of the death penalty, an interest different from the empirical inquiry into the 
effectiveness and reliability of capital punishment as a penological tool.  With her deontological moral 
outlook, noted abolitionist Professor Carol Steiker takes aim at Professors Cass Sunstein and Adrian 
Vermuele’s consequentialist argument that if recent studies showing the significant deterrent impact of the 
death penalty are valid, then we are morally bound to accept capital punishment as a government crime-
fighting tool.  I contend that a deontological critique of the Sunstein-Vermeule claim, which is rooted in 
consequentialist ethics, must fail when it comes to the moral question of capital punishment.  
Steiker’s effort to debunk Sunstein and Vermeule’s bold contention nicely illuminates why abstract 
moral theorizing is futile when it comes to capital punishment.  She agrees with Sunstein and Vermeule 
that we must abandon the act-omission distinction when it comes to evaluating the moral worthiness of 
government policy options.  I show that Steiker’s concession to abandon the act-omission distinction---a 
distinction crucial to deontology--dooms her critique of Sunstein and Vermeule’s consequentialist claim 
that the death penalty is morally obligatory.  I also show that Sunstein and Vermuele’s argument is pure 
question-begging, that their collapse of the act-omission distinction to drive their moral argument smuggles 
in the unproved assumption that the death penalty is already morally justified.  The lesson here is that 
moral claims about the death penalty arising from a deontological or consequentialist foundation inevitably 
collapse under the weight of real life.  This 6,000-word article calls for continued focus on the realities of 
the death penalty as a practice, and thus discourages futile argumentation over that practice by resorting to 
abstract moral theorizing.
THE FUTILE DEBATE OVER THE 
MORALITY OF THE DEATH PENALTY:
A CRITICAL COMMENTARY ON THE STEIKER AND SUNSTEIN-VERMUEULE DEBATE
Just when we thought we=ve read and heard all there is to be written and said about the 
morality of the death penalty, along comes a new debate.  In a recent issue of the Stanford Law 
Review, Professor Carol Steiker, a committed death-penalty abolitionist, takes aim with abstract 
moral theory at the provocative moral musings of Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule.1  Sunstein 
and Vermeule argue that, if the death penalty substantially deters murdersCand they cite to recent 
studies that suggest as much, though the quality of those studies is subject to vigorous 
challenge2Cthen the state is morally obliged to use it as a form of punishment.  There is, they 
say, a life-life tradeoff that cannot be shoved out of the way with the deontological slogan that it 
is wrong to kill, period.  There is killing either wayCthe state kills to save innocent lives or 
murderers kill knowing that their own right to life will receive full sovereign protection. To 
Sunstein and Vermeule, hard evidence trumps moral kitsch.  Steiker responds that a 
deontologistCa non-consequentialist, rights-based personCought not be persuaded by this claim 
of moral obligation because deontological moral theory commits us to an abolitionist stance, no 
matter what a utilitarian calculus might otherwise obligate us to do. 
The debate, though engaging, proves what we already know: the entire enterprise of 
abstract moral theorizing, using the conventional moral categories of consequentialism and 
deontology, to somehow resolve disagreement over the highly politicized issue of capital 
1See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required?  Acts, Omissions, and 
Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 703 (2005); Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment is Not Morally Required: 
Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 751 (2005).
2John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate,
58 Stan. L. Rev. 791 (2005).  For more on the empirical side of the issue, see Michael L. Radelet & Ronald L. Akers, 
2punishment is futile.  The debate takes on the flavor of most moral debates, both sides arguing 
from incompatible premises and neither can articulate a neutral premise against which to evaluate 
their arguments.  The philosopher Alisdair MacIntyre put it best:  AIf two reasonable parties to . . 
. a moral debate cannot discover criteria, appeal to which will settle the matter impersonally for 
both, then neither party can be basing his own conviction on such an appeal.  Confronted with the 
dilemma which creates the debate, each individual can only make explicitly or implicitly an 
arbitrary choice.  Unreason and arbitrariness are internalized.@3
I. Collapsing the Act-Omission Distinction
Sunstein and Vermeule believe they have hit upon a neutral criteria to resolve the moral 
conundrum of capital punishment:  the desire to preserve life.4 The only way to evade the 
implications of that criteria in the face of hard evidence that the death penalty saves lives, they 
insist, is to invoke the act-omission distinction.  That distinction generates space to assert that the 
government’s act of killing is morally distinguishable from the omission of acquiescing to more 
murders that are preventable.  The key to Sunstein and Vermeule’s argument is their disavowal 
of the act-omission distinction when it comes to the moral issue of capital punishment.  Not that 
the act-omission distinction is intrinsically meaningless or morally irrelevant.  Claiming a 
distinction lacks moral significance in one context doesn’t imply that the distinction never has 
moral significance.  Rather, by positing as a fact that the death penalty actively deters many 
Deterrence and the Death Penalty:  The Views of the Experts, 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1 (1996).
3Alisdair MacIntyre, Patients as Agents, in PHILOSOPHICAL MEDICAL ETHICS: ITS NATURE AND 
SIGNIFICANCE 198-99 (Stuart F. Spicker & H. Tristan Englehardt, Jr. eds., 1977).
4Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 705.
3murders (upwards of eighteen for each execution carried out), Sunstein and Vermeule exploit 
their collapse of the act-omission distinction (as opposed to its philosophical collapse) to press a 
moral argument in favor of the death penalty that is overtly consequentialist.
When I say consequentialist, I have in mind, broadl y speaking, utilitarianism.  Sunstein 
and Vermeule may want to eschew that categorization but the fact is that their argument 
ultimately rests on a calculation of benefitsCthe aggregate good in saving eighteen lives exceeds 
the aggregate good of foregoing capital punishment and opting instead for imposing life 
imprisonment on the convicted murderer.  This essay is not the place to explore the richness of 
utilitarianism as a way of moral theorizing, but it is worth very briefly considering the claim that 
there may be good reasons for a utilitarian to reject the simplistic calculation that is at the heart 
of Sunstein and Vermeule=s argument.  A rule-utilitarianCa person who focuses on the utility of 
adhering consistently to a rule rather than evaluating a particular act through that act=s perceived 
utility in maximizing the aggregate goodCmay conclude, after calculating the aggregate good by 
considering the good and bad consequences of having a system of capital punishment, that the 
life-life tradeoff that Sunstein and Vermeule identify is not sufficiently compelling to overcome a 
utilitarian rule against capital punishment.  The problem with this claim is that a rule-utilitarian 
would have to admit that there exists some life-life tradeoff (twenty-five lives, or maybe fifty, or 
one hundred saved for each execution) that would justify an exception to the anti-death penalty 
rule.  That is, rule-utilitarianism, when pushed hard enough, collapses into conventional act-
utilitarianism.  And if it doesn=t, then we would rightly question whether the rule that the rule-
utilitarian embraces is rooted in utilitarianism at all.  That is, the rule-utilitarian may be a 
4disguised deontologist, or vice versa.  All this is to say that Sunstein and Vermueule=s life-life 
tradeoff argument is, at bottom, utilitarian in the most basic sense.  And that, in turn, means that 
they are committed to a system of moral obligation rooted in comparing states of affairs arising 
from pursuing one course of action over another.
Deontologists and utilitarians have been trading blows for a long time. Steiker=s attack on 
Sunstein and Vermeule, then, is not a surprising event, philosophically speaking.  It happens to 
be another occasion for witnessing the collision of these two approaches to moral theorizing.  
Steiker=s deontological objections to capital punishment are built upon a belief that killing 
murderers as a form of punishment violates their rights to life and corrodes the value we place on 
our own.  I=ll leave aside for this essay the speculative, though attractive, idea that we ought to 
reject capital punishment for the sake of our own souls.  I want to home in on Steiker=s 
deontological thesis that vindicating the right of one convicted murderer not to be executed 
necessarily trumps the aggregate good of saving eighteen victims of murderous violence.  Steiker 
undoubtedly would prefer not to package the issue this wayCshe=s an astute enough advocate to 
know that packaging the issue is vital to persuasion.  But deontology necessarily treats rights as 
trumps over competing claims for social utility.5  So the upshot of any deontological attack on 
Sunstein and Vermeule must own up to the fact that what is being trumped by vindicating the 
convicted murderer=s purported right to life are the lives of innocent people.  
We should note here that Sunstein and Vermeule=s consequentialism seems especially 
well-suited to state action, where the name of the game is to produce good states of affairs for the 
5See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, ix (1977)
5populace.  The consequentialist question, what outcome did the action produce?, is exactly what 
we want to know when it comes to good government.  The deontological desire to know what 
virtue there is in the action itself, in the action as an intrinsic matter, seems self-indulgent, 
abstract, too philosophical.  After all, good governments exist, presumably, to produce states of 
affairs conducive to the well-being of the people.  Indeed, the very idea of ethics, and the 
concomitant inevitability of moral discourse structured around notions of obligation, presupposes 
that action by rational agents is motivated by a desire to bring about some outcome.  So, 
assuming executing certain murderers produces a highly desirable outcome, we must ask what 
deontological Avirtue@ is being tarnished by embracing capital punishment.  That is, the real force 
and value of Sunstein and Vermeule=s consequentialist argument is that it demands an answer to 
this question: why would we accept eighteen murders that could in fact be averted by executing 
one convicted murderer who, after a fair trial, has been deemed death-worthy under the law?
Steiker really has no non-consequentialist answer to that question.6  But her struggle to 
overcome the question (which is different from answering it) is worth our attention because she 
refuses the escape-hatch of empiricism and bravely accepts three key propositions that serve as a 
launching pad for Sunstein and Vermueule=s moral argument that bona fide deterrence makes 
capital punishment morally obligatory: one, that the state is a moral agent, dedicated through its 
actions to pursuing particular outcomes; two, that its actions must be guided by and evaluated 
6Steiker=s affirmative case against capital punishment amounts to a portrayal of an outcome that capital 
punishment produces in society, and that outcomeCthat state of affairs, if you willCis too distasteful to countenance. 
 Steiker, supra note 1, at 769-82.  She packages her argument as deontological, but it is actually consequentialist in 
that the bottom line to her abolitionist argument is that her portrait of the state of affairs capital punishment produces 
in society is worse than the state of affairs Sunstein and Vermeule portray in their pro-death penalty argument.
6according to moral principles; and three, that the act-omission distinction cannot shield the state, 
as a moral agent, from its responsibility for certain outcomes, even those affirmatively undesired, 
arising from its policy choices.  The inadequacy of Steiker=s answer to Sunstein and Vermeule 
doesn=t mean that Sunstein and Vermeule are right in their moral claim about capital punishment 
under the stipulation that executions save lives.  What I contend here is that Steiker=s inadequate, 
though valiant, effort to counter the intuitively compelling claim put forth by Sunstein and 
Vermeule underscores the futility of debating capital punishment through abstract moral theories.
I want to underscore that the problem with Steiker=s attack on Sunstein and Vermeule=s 
moral argument has nothing to do with the skill and acuity she brings to the task.  Rather, the 
effort to trump through deontology Sunstein and Vermeule=s consequentialist claim of moral 
obligation to support capital punishment inevitably fails once we concede that the act-omission 
distinction is nothing more than a bit of analytical bad faith.  The reason the concession is fatal to 
Steiker=s attack on Sunstein and Vermeule lies in the nature of consequentialism itself.  Steiker 
mistakenly believes that Sunstein and Vermeule=s removal of the act-omission distinction as an 
available shield against moral judgment is a remarkable twist in the death-penalty debate.7  It 
isn=t.  The act-omission distinction, so crucial to deontological thinking, inevitably collapses 
under the weight of any consequentialist moral system.8  And so, when Steiker hops on board to 
disavow the act-omission distinction, she necessarily abandons the very moral system that she 
7Steiker, supra note 1, at 754.
8See J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 94-95 (1973).
7hopes to use against Sunstein and Vermeule, and instead, embraces theirs.9
II. Re-contextualizing Moral Assessments
Steiker=s primary analytical move to avoid crashing headlong into consequentialism is to 
change the subject.  She takes aim at what she considers an illegitimate assumption undergirding 
Sunstein and Vermeule=s act-omission argument.  While she approves of their insight that the 
act-omission distinction is no shield against moral judgment for government inaction, she argues 
that they improperly disavow the distinction between purposeful and non-purposeful killing.  
Steiker insists that the single life of the murderer that is taken through execution cannot be 
equated with the lives of future murder victims because the government purposely kills when it 
executes but only knowingly accepts that certain people will be murdered as a result of its refusal 
to execute.  Steiker agrees that the state is morally responsible for the death of the executed
murderer and the executed innocents, but the nature of that moral responsibility differs.  Differs, 
Steiker insists, because we have purposeful killing versus knowing death.  Rejecting the act-
omission distinction, Steiker argues, does not commit oneself to equating killings that are 
purposeful and those that are knowing.  The former, she says, are more morally reprehensible 
than the latter, and so the state is morally obligated to regard the convicted capital murderer=s 
right to life as a trump over the lives that could be saved by his execution.
Steiker=s emphasis on the purpose-knowing distinction bespeaks more the lawyer=s mind 
than the moral philosopher=s.  Even if true that criminal law posits, as a general matter, that 
purposeful killings are more blameworthy than other sorts of killings, it doesn=t make it so, 
9See note 6, supra.
8morally speaking.10  A purposeful mercy killing is not as blameworthy as a depraved-heart 
reckless rooftop sniper who knows that his indiscriminate shooting will likely result in harm.  An 
impulsive decision to kill may be more despicable than a purposeful killing by a Abrooding, self-
doubting, self-reflective offender.@11  Blameworthiness is, at best, only partially captured in 
categorizing an act as purposeful or knowing or reckless, and often categorizing in that way as a 
shorthand for moral judgment actually warps the assessment of blameworthiness.  It is the why-
ness of the killing that allows for genuine moral judgment, not the mere what-ness of it.  That=s 
why it is simply untrue that criminal-law blameworthiness is unconcerned with motive, with why 
a defendant has killed.  The myth, I suspect, sustains itself from the misleading assertion, often 
stated in criminal trials, that the prosecution need not prove motive to secure a conviction.  
Prosecutors and defense lawyers know that motive is crucial to adjudicating criminal cases.  On 
the doctrinal level, motive is smuggled into the analysis through various defense claims, such as 
provocation, duress, necessity, self-defense, etc.  These defense claims are ways to soften the 
rigidity of the mens rea categoriesCto bend them, really, to accord with our moral 
intuitionsCprecisely because those conventional mens rea categories are inadequate vessels for 
moral evaluation.12  Through her unquestioned use of legal categories as proxies for moral 
judgment, Steiker engages in a form of moral decontextualization in her effort to pursue a moral 
10 Capital jurisprudence makes this precise point.  In Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), the Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutional validity of a death sentence predicated on acts of extreme recklessness.
11SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, JUDGING EVIL: RETHINKING THE LAW OF MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER 104-05.
12See ALAN NORRIE, LAW AND THE BEAUTIFUL SOUL 59-60 (2005)  PILLSBURY, supra note 10, at 105 
(Awhat premeditation misses is the moral importance of the motive for the homicide@).  Cf. American Law Institute, 
Model Penal Code and Commentaries, Comment to sec. 3.02 at 14-15 (1985) (arguing the moral acceptability of 
knowingly or purposely killing some to save many more innocents).
9attack on Sunstein and VermeuleCa process of moral decontextualization that animates criminal 
law theorizing in its pursuit of universal rules and standards that are always threatened by too 
much subjectivity.13
So, one direction to take Sunstein and Vermeule=s premise that the state is a moral agent 
is that we are obligated to evaluate state policies about the death penalty from a morally infused 
contextual point of view.  Let us compare two states.  State A has the death penalty because, as a 
moral agent, it has chosen to execute certain death-worthy murderers in order to save the lives of 
innocent residents.  State B refuses to enact the death penalty because, as a moral agent, it does 
not want to increase the tax burden of its citizenry, the death penalty being an extremely 
expensive policy to pursue.  State B, then, sacrifices the lives of innocents for financial reasons.  
That State B=s policy against the death penalty may accord with one=s moral sentiments does not 
meanCor at least, doesn=t necessarily meanCthat State B, as a moral agent, has acted in a morally 
superior way when compared to State A, even though State A has chosen to purposefully kill 
certain murderers.   What may be most useful, then, in Sunstein and Vermeule=s argument is the 
simple challenge to abolitionists to give a non-empirical, non-consequentialist answer to why we 
must vindicate the murderer=s purported right to life through the acceptance of the empirical 
reality that eighteen innocents will lose theirs.  What morally defensible motive could a state 
have not to use capital punishment, in the face of such a life-life tradeoff?
Steiker cannot meet this challenge, avoiding the whole issue of motive and lapsing 
instead into a form of rule-utilitarianism that inevitably devolves into a form of consequentialism 
13For one among many investigations into this process, see CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE 
MAN (2005).
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that Sunstein and Vermeule advocate.  To be sure, I understand Steiker to be arguing for the 
moral limits of state action, and that therefore motivations, on her account, are irrelevant to her 
deontological objections to capital punishment as a criminal-justice tool.  But her attack on 
Sunstein and Vermeule=s utilitarian position with the argument that purposeful killings are more 
morally blameworthy than other sorts of killings necessarily invites consideration of motivation 
in the moral calculus precisely because blameworthiness depends on such consideration.  But 
more importantly, we can now see why Steiker=s deontological deployment of certain 
hypothetical moral quandaries doesn=t undercut Sunstein and Vermeule=s utilitarian position.  She 
points, for example, to the famous Jim-and-the-Indians quandary, made famous by the moral 
philosopher Bernard Williams.14  Suppose a diabolical South American military commander 
intends to kill twenty Indians, but he is willing to spare nineteen if Jim will choose one to kill.  
Should Jim save the nineteenCwhich is to say, should he kill?  Take another famous hypothetical 
that Steiker calls upon, this one from Judith Jarvis ThomsonCthe brakeless trolley scenarios.15
Suppose the only way to stop a brakeless trolley from crashing and killing five bystanders on the 
track is to push one innocent bystander onto the track so that the bystander=s body will act as a 
brake on the speeding trolley.  The bystander will die, but the five others will live.  What do we 
make of the act of pushing the bystander onto the track?  Suppose, instead, the driver of the 
trolley switches it onto a different track where an unwitting bystander will be struck, but the five 
others will be saved.  Is there something different here about that saving act than the saving act of 
14See Smart & Williams, supra note 8, at 98.
15JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY 94 (William 
Parent ed., 1986).
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pushing the bystander onto the track?
As an initial matter, it is clear that in evaluating the moral quality of the agent=s act in 
each of these hypothetical scenarios, we would rightly consider the actor=s motivation.  If, for 
example, Jim allowed the Indians to die because of cowardice rather than moral principle, we 
would look upon Jim in a particularly unfavorable moral light, even if the outcome itself may be 
considered morally justified.  Likewise if the bystander were shoved onto the track because he is 
a hated colleague.  But leaving aside the moral significance of contextualizing the act by taking 
into account motive, the deontological approach would reason from the proposition that it is 
wrong to use one Indian or one bystander as a means to serve some utilitarian endCor to put it 
more bluntly, the lives of nineteen Indians or five bystanders must be sacrificed to vindicate the 
right to life of the one.  Of course, the deontologist necessarily resorts to the act-omission 
distinction to argue that Jim=s omission (his refusal to kill) absolves him of any moral 
responsibility for another=s act of killing.  But Steiker as deontologist has removed that 
possibility for herself, having accepted Sunstein and Vermeule=s premise that the act-omission 
distinction cannot shield the state from moral evaluation.  Similarly, a deontologist would 
condemn pushing the individual onto the track to save five but would not condemn running over 
an individual who happens to be on the trackCagain, resorting to the moral significance of the 
act-omission distinction, a distinction nurtured in this scenario by the injunction against violating 
one person=s right to life to achieve the greater good of saving five others (or ten? or a hundred? 
or a thousand?).
The philosopher Robert Nozick insists upon the deontological commitment to preserving 
12
rights through the act-omission distinction by asking, AWhy . . . hold that some persons have to 
bear some costs that benefit other persons more, for the sake of the overall social good?@16  Why, 
indeed, should any one Indian, or an unwitting bystander pushed in front of the trolley, pay with 
his life for the preservation of the lives of others?  But what Sunstein and Vermeule ask of us has 
a quite different moral flavor: why not have the convicted capital murderer bear the cost of 
saving the lives of people who would otherwise be murdered?  Steiker=s deontology would 
answer, because the murderer has the right to life, too, and that right can=t be sacrificed to 
promote the greater good.
There you have it: the boiled-down essence of the deontological claim.  The capital 
murderer cannot be forced to pay for, with his tarnished life, the preservation of eighteen 
innocent lives.  Maybe so, but deontological theorizing doesn=t, as an analytic matter, get us to 
that conclusion, as Steiker seems to think.  First, there is the consideration that the Kantian 
injunction against being treated as a means to an end might be forfeitable.  Deontology posits that 
this Kantian injunction must have deliberative priority in moral evaluationCwhich is to say, that 
when we deliberate on conflicting obligations, this injunction must take priority in the weighing 
of considerations bearing on the competing arguments supporting one or the other obligation.  
But this deliberative priority may be forfeitable.
Certain convicted murderers, one might insist, have forfeited their right to impose upon 
the injured collective the obligation to give deliberative priority to the injunction never to be 
treated as a means to a socially useful end.  This is different from making the more conventional 
16NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, UTOPIA 33 (1974).
13
claim that murderers have forfeited their right to life.17  It is only saying that the right-to-life 
trump-card may lose some of its value as a deliberative priorityCnot all, just someCwhen the 
holder of the card has committed a particularly egregious murder.  Put in Kantian terms, the 
murderer forfeits his right to invoke the injunction against being used for utilitarian gain by 
virtue of his crime, which entailed precisely that immoralityCdepriving the victim of the right not 
to be used to gratify the murderer=s appetite for killing.  I=m not suggesting here that Kantian 
ethics demands this view, but only that it partakes of the Kantian idea that what a person 
deserves is related to what he does.  Kant argues that a murderer deserves execution because the 
murderer has killed; I posit as an idea to reckon with the reap-what-you-sow proposition that a 
murderer forfeits the injunction against utilitarian treatment because the murderer engaged in his 
own privatized utilitarian calculus when he killed.18
So, an innocent bystander may have the right not to be pushed in front of a trolley to save 
others, and each Indian may have the right not to be singled out and killed to save othersCtheir 
rights to life trump those utilitarian calculationsCbut the deontologist has no dispositive moral 
argument that the convicted murderer is on the same ontological footing as these innocents who 
are to be used for the greater social good.  Steiker simply ignores the availability of constructing 
17See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 172 (P. Laslett 2d ed. 1963).  For an attack on 
this forfeiture argument, see Hugo Adam Bedau, Capital Punishment, in MATTERS OF LIFE AND DEATH (T. Regan 2d 
ed. 1985).  Kant=s endorsement of capital punishment is associated with the theory of retributivism, the offender 
getting his just deserts.  Only within that moral framework would Kant accept the notion of the murderer forfeiting 
his life.  See KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 101 (John Ladd, trans. 1965).  A[I]f you kill,@ Kant says, 
then Ayou kill yourself.@
18Note that this point doesn=t imply, as Kant=s more direct argument favoring capital punishment arguably 
does, that an offender deserves getting the same treatment as he inflicted on the victim (rape rapists, burn arsonists, 
steal from thieves, etc.).  It only posits that the offender loses the entitlement to insist upon the Kantian injunction 
against being used as a means to promote the aggregate good.
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the ontological categories of guilty people and innocent people and then infusing those categories 
with moral significance when it comes to deciding when it is appropriate to use utilitarian 
reasoning.  If we accept guilt and innocence as ontological categories and commit ourselves to 
treating those categories as morally significantCdeontology doesn=t, as an analytic matter, help us 
out hereCthen it may well be persuasive to a deontologist that a convicted murderer ought to be 
executed to save eighteen innocents because that murderer has forfeited the right not to be treated 
in a way that satisfies utilitarian demands.  The point here is not that a deontologist must accept 
the utilitarian demandsCSunstein and Vermeule reach too far in making that claimCbut that 
deontology is not by itself a way to defeat the Aforfeiture@ argument that, in some people=s minds, 
supports the thrust of Sunstein and Vermeule=s moral claim.
Steiker=s deontology thesis doesn=t refute Sunstein and Vermeule=s argument even if we 
bracket the Aforfeiture@ idea.  Let us posit that convicted murderers retain their Kantian immunity 
against being treated as means to an end.  What that means in a legal regime built upon a 
discourse of rights is that convicted murderers have a claim of right that bars the state from using 
the aggregate good as a justificatory basis for executing them. That claim of right imposes upon 
the state a duty not to use capital punishment.  A utilitarian would recognize this claim of right, 
and the entire regime of rights, as worthy of respect only to the extend that the rights-regime 
promotes the aggregate good.  A utilitarian, then, would be open to withdrawing support for this 
claim of right if the utility calculation demands it.  A deontologist, one would think, would insist 
upon the claim of right, no matter how the aggregate good is increased or decreased. 
But the matter isn=t that simple when we accept Sunstein and Vermeule=s key premise that 
15
the state is a moral agent whose actions must be evaluated through moral principles, suitably 
contextualized.  The state as moral agent owes a duty not only to the convicted murderer, by 
virtue of the murderer=s purported claim of right not to be executed, but also a duty to protect the 
law-abiding citizenry against being murdered, a duty derived from the citizenry=s claim of right to 
bodily security.  The act-omission distinction, which might in some contexts be available as a 
shield against moral judgment, has been stipulated away by Steiker.  And the purposeful-
nonpurposeful distinction is useful but inadequate to evaluate moral action.  So, what the 
deterrence argument asks the deontologist to consider is the moral worthiness of breaching one 
duty so as to honor the other.  Maybe at bottom it is nothing more than sentiment, but most 
people are inclined to honor the duty owed to the law-abiding citizenry rather than breach it for 
the sake of vindicating the claim of right asserted by the convicted murderer not to be executed 
for his crime.  This particular intuition derives from another intuition: one guilty person=s claim 
of right to life is not as weighty, not as deserving of respect, as the exact same claim of right 
asserted by, say, eighteen innocent persons who will die if the state withholds capital punishment 
as a juridical tool.  This latter intuition rests on the indisputable proposition that the state must 
give near-dispositive deliberative priority to the people=s claim of right not to be killed, assaulted, 
or otherwise arbitrarily impeded in pursuing their own productive aims in life.
Now, suppose we combine the forfeiture idea with this conflicting-rights idea.  Kantian 
ethics allow for the relinquishment of rights through the device of consent.  The convicted 
murderer presumably has an actual interest in not being executed for his crime, an interest rooted 
in the brute fact that he wants to keep living, even if life has been reduced to the miserable 
16
conditions of a concrete-and-steel penitentiary.  But that doesn=t mean the convicted murderer=s 
actual interest must be equated with his antecedent interest, as a rational agent of the Kantian 
sort, in seeing to it that convicted murderers are executed for the sake of vindicating the 
citizenry=s claim of right to be protected against being murdered.  That is, the convicted murderer 
could be understood to have granted consent to execution by virtue of his membership in the 
community.  Put another way, the convicted murderer=s execution is the debt he owes to society, 
a debt that he, as a Kantian rational agent, agrees to own up to.19  Recall Nozick=s question,  
AWhy . . . hold that some persons have to bear some costs that benefit other persons more, for the 
sake of the overall social good?@  We might say that the convicted murderer must bear the cost of 
saving the lives of eighteen innocents as part of his debt to the community.  The convicted 
murderer, on this account, forfeits his claim of right, not by the mere fact of the crime, but by a 
consent that is embedded within his membership in the community through the force of his 
Kantian agency.
III. Slippery Slopes
No attack on a consequentialist claim would be complete without the tried-and-true 
slippery-slope arguments, and Steiker trots them out.20  If the death penalty deters, and if the 
moral evaluation of it comes down to simple life-life tradeoffs, then why not torture, why not 
execute the offender=s loved ones, why not extend capital punishment to more crimes, why not do 
all sorts of horrific things to scare the criminality out of all of us?  First, a philosophical point:  
19See HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 33-36 (1976).  See generally ANDREW VON HIRSCH, 
DOING JUSTICE 66 (1976); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES (1985).
20Steiker, supra note 1, at 775.
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some, not all, slippery-slope arguments focus on what is at the bottom of the slope, the horrible 
endgame immanent within an argument.  Others emphasize the slipperiness of the slope, that 
there is no way to get off of it, which means all we are left with are arbitrary distinctions.  Steiker 
focuses on the bottom of the slope.  But is the slope actually slippery?
Steiker’s point in focusing on other horrible practices that utilitarianism may countenance 
is really not a warning that we will actually embrace those practices if we institute capital 
punishment.  So she is not suggesting we actually will slide to the bottom.  Rather, she is arguing 
that the fact that these horrible practices exist at the bottom of the utilitarian slope reveals that the 
practice of capital punishment on actual death-worthy murderers (leaving aside whether the 
concept of death-worthiness is morally coherent) is itself intrinsically immoral.  The horrible 
practices at the bottom of the slope merely help to illuminate that supposed intrinsic immorality.
But pointing to what is at the bottom of the slope is unpersuasive because certain 
activities within any acceptable moral system can have no deliberative priority, simply because 
they are so horrible.  In deliberating on how to make the populace safer, we can rightly insist that 
government killing of innocents, or the torturing of anyone, be given no priority at all (which is 
to say, the slope isn’t slippery).  Why?  Because a deliberative process to arrive at policy 
imperatives must give ultimate priority to reliability, meaning the maintenance of a state of 
affairs whereby people can reasonably insist that certain thingsClike the killing or torturing of 
innocents, by anyoneCought not occur, under any circumstances.  The whole point to crafting a 
system of obligations, be it utilitarian or deontological in its foundation, is the cementing of 
feelings of reliability.  Without those cemented feelings of reliabilityCand government brutality 
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upon innocents that is justified through a utilitarian calculation would be inimical to thatCsocial 
and civic life would be impossible.21  Indeed, in such circumstances, human life as a worthwhile 
value would be impossible.  For this reason, it is possible to reach a societal consensus that 
allowing X (say, capital punishment) will not imply an allowance of Y (torturing or killing the 
murderer’s loved ones).  A slope is slippery when such consensus is unattainable, because 
without that consensus, allowing X does in fact threaten to produce Y.
One other point regarding the weakness of Steiker’s slippery-slope arguments deserves 
mentioning.  Punishment is not simply an act of inflicting unpleasantness upon another.  
Punishment is itself a practice, one tied to a larger scheme of socio-political practices.  Capital 
punishment, then, denotes not just the act of executing an offender; the term embraces an entire 
institutional practice of accomplishing that aim within a regime of norms.22  So, a defender of 
capital punishment is not defending the killing of the offender in and of itself, but is defending an 
institutional practice, and that institutional practice has its own boundaries that are off the 
utilitarian calculus.  Specifically, the institutional practice of punishment is bounded by the 
principle that only properly adjudicated guilty persons can be punished.  So, a consequentialist 
defense of capital punishment cannot be attacked with slippery-slope arguments predicated on 
the absurdity that the practice of punishment has no institutional constraints.  There is no slippery 
slope, in short, where our real-life practices take place on solid footing and the supposed 
21I think we have to admit that government brutality against Aenemies@Cbe they convicted criminals, 
communists, Islamist fundamentalists, illegal aliens, etc.Cdoes not render social and civic life impossible.  In fact, 
much government brutality (we call it foreign policy) takes place to promote our unsustainable standard of living.  
But I digress.
22Cf. John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules 64 Phil. Rev. 3 (1955) (articulating punishment as an institution or 
practice). 
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slipperiness is not true to our experiences.23
IV. The Futility of It All
There is no analytic resolution to the quandary between a rights-based outlook and a 
consequentialist outlook.  The deontological argument, like the utilitarian argument, inevitably 
collapses with the weight of real life.  Even if capital punishment detersCI highly doubt that it 
does, and I remain convinced that it is unprovableCthere is still the reality that the human mind 
is incapable of making judgments that even utilitarians agree must be made in any arguably just 
capital-sentencing scheme, judgments mired in psychological facts so thick with ambiguity that 
mistakes in evaluating death-worthiness are bound to be made.  
We can see the monumental difficulty immanent in the practice of executing offenders by 
taking seriously the linguistic challenge that capital jurisprudence faces: how do we articulate a 
meaningful standard for evaluating when an offender has forfeited his Kantian immunity against 
being used for utilitarian ends?  Sunstein and Vermeule concede, as any decent human being 
must, that there are huge constraints on utilitarian thinking (we cannot simply sacrifice innocent 
lives simply because doing so will preserve more livesCthat=s a recipe for such horrors as organ 
harvesting).  And so they must concede that capital punishment, even if it is a marvelous 
deterrent tool, must be reserved only for the deserving, whatever desert might mean.  The 
linguistic challenge, which I suspect is an insurmountable challenge, is to articulate a notion of 
desert that allows for mistake-free judgments about death-worthiness.  That puts the death-
penalty debate in the frame of human cognition, of our capacities as rational beings.  Moral 
23 Cf. Andrew von Hirsch, Lifeboat Law, 4 Crim. Just. Ethics 88, 90 (1985) (discussing utilitarianism and 
the need to consider the ramifications of institutionalizing certain brutalizing practices).
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judgments, in my view, derive from that frame of referenceCessentially from judgments about 
what is healthy and unhealthy, what promotes and what impedes human flourishingCnot from 
abstract commitments to one philosophical school or another.  Steiker=s futile quarrel with 
Sunstein and Vermeule exemplifies this observation.
***
There=s a beauty and a problem with Sunstein and Vermeule=s argument.  The beauty is 
that non-progressive, hard-line law-and-order types who want to seize on Sunstein and 
Vermeule=s claim that capital punishment is morally obligatory will find themselves trying to 
disentangle their way out of a very politically progressive net.  The consequentialism we find in 
Sunstein and Vermeule is, as they themselves recognize and endorse, a recipe for very active 
government, one that is morally obliged to attack all sorts of injustices that government inaction 
directly produces.24  The problem is precisely what plagues consequentialism generally as a 
decisional tool for policy-making.  It rests on an empiricism that cuts out too many complicating 
factors and considerations.  That=s a nice way of saying that their consequentialism is, ultimately, 
too simplistic, too crude a tool, that it can=t adequately account for the practical difficulties of 
pursuing something that is itself morally problematic from a deontological point of view.  
We can put our criticism of Sunstein and Vermeule within the same terms that they have 
used to frame their argument; that is, we can take back Steiker’s ill-advised concession.  The act-
omission distinction does matter in this context.  Sunstein and Vermeule’s collapse of that 
distinction generates a pure question-begging argument, for it smuggles in the un-argued 
assumption that the “omission” (not implementing capital punishment) equals an “act” (killing 
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innocents) because implementing capital punishment is in fact viable.  This smuggled-in 
assumption is crucial because, when we collapse the act-omission distinction, we are necessarily 
saying that the omission has, in some meaningful way, brought about the outcome in question.  
In this context, this means that the absence of capital punishment brought about the additional 
deaths of innocents; and that necessarily implies that capital punishment is, in fact, a morally 
available option, for an omission matters (such that the act-omission distinction collapses) only if 
something other than the purported non-action could have been done.  But is that implication 
true? Maybe, and maybe not.  What is precisely at issue in the debate over capital punishment is 
exactly that question, its moral viability.  If capital punishment is not morally justifiable, then we 
cannot have a normative expectation that it be implemented.  And without that normative 
expectation, it makes no sense to speak of an omission that matters---that is, an omission that has 
genuine salience when considering the moral significance of higher murder rates in jurisdictions 
that don’t have the death penalty.  Sunstein and Vermeule assume that the normative expectation 
rightly exists when, in fact, that is precisely what the debate has yet to resolve. Collapsing the 
act-omission distinction conceals that question-begging assumption through the heated 
emotionalism of the ensuing argument that the morality of the death penalty boils down to a 
utilitarian calculus that puts a premium on saving lives.
One other point:  Moral squabbles make no sense when feasible alternatives to a course 
of action exist that moot the moral dilemma or change the frame of the debate.  Any moral debate 
about the death penalty would be incomplete without incorporating within it the feasibility of 
alternatives to killing offenders for their particularly heinous crimes.  This reflects the fact that 
24 See Cass Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Deterring Murder:  A Reply, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 847, 849 (2006).
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moral arguments cannot be divorced from social necessity.  This truth can be directed at the 
deontologists, too.  An abstract moral claim that the death penalty is wrong would lose its force if 
it were shown that no alternative existed to deal with particularly reprehensible murderersCan 
implausible scenario, in my view, except perhaps in the case of prison killings by inmates already 
serving parole-ineligible life sentences.
So, deontology may be no answer to consequentialism, but in the capital punishment 
context, consequentialism is no trump over deontology, not because of the power of deontology 
as a moral system in the abstract, but because of the practical considerations that a deontological 
moral system invites us to consider. Jack Greenberg wrote twenty years ago that Aany current 
debate over the death penalty cannot ignore the deep moral deficiencies of the present system.@25
 I take him to mean, at least in part, that it is futile to engage in a moral squabble when what is 
being defended or proposed is an idealized version of a system that bears almost no resemblance 
to reality.  That was true twenty years ago, and it remains true today.
25Jack Greenberg, Against the American System of Capital Punishment, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1670, 1678 
(1986).
